Find solution and essay(Easy work) Research Paper

Find solution and essay(Easy work) - Research Paper Example From the lists of tables provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 2.1 shows the Personal Income and its Disposition (www.bea.gov, 1). Nominal personal income for the first quarter of 2011 is $12,980 billion while nominal disposable income is $11,711.6 billion after deducting nominal or current personal taxes of $1,268.4 billion. Nominal personal consumption or personal consumption expenditures comprise the largest part of the personal outlays as it amounted to $10, 683.8 billion. The nominal personal savings or the amount left from the disposable income after deduction of the personal outlays is $663.6 billion. Marginal propensity to save or MPS is the increase in savings per unit increase in income. It is computed by dividing the change in savings by the change in income. From the same table, Table 2.1, savings increased from $640 billion in the last quarter of 2010 to $663.6 billion in the first quarter in 2011. This means that savings increased by $23.6 billion. On the other hand, personal income also increased from $12,724 billion in the last quarter of 2010 to $12,980 billion in the first quarter of 2011. After subtracting the two amounts, there was a $256 billion increase in the personal income. From the formula, MPS = change in savings / change in income, MPS is equal to 0.09. Marginal propensity to consume or MPC is the increase in consumption spending per unit increase in income. It is computed by dividing the change in consumption expenditures by the change in income. And based from Table 2.1, personal consumption expenditure in the last quarter of 2010 was $10,513.6 and $10,683.8 in the first quarter of 2011. So, a $170.2 billion increase in personal consumption expenditure was computed. Following the formula, MPC = change in consumption/ change in income, MPC is equal to 0 .66. However, if MPS and MPC will be computed using income after deduction of

Von Mangoldt function Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

Von Mangoldt function - Essay Example There are various functions that relates to the Von function. Some of the functions that relates to the Von function is the mobius function, the divisor function and the phi function amongst others. In number theory, the phi function φ(n), is a part of the arithmetic function that counts the n totatives, that is, the positive integers that are less than or equal to n that are mainly prime to n. If n is a positive integer, then φ(n) is the integer number k in the range 1 ≠¤ k ≠¤ n for which the biggest common divisor gcd (n,k)=1. The totient function refers to a multiplicative function that means that where two numbers n and m are relatively prim, then φ(mn)  =  Ãâ€ (m)φ(n). The Euler’s product formula states A divisor function is also a part of the arithmetic function linked to the integer divisors. When denoted as the divisor function, it states the integer divisors number. It comes out as a remarkable identities involving relationships with the Eisenstein series and Riemann zeta function of modular forms. A linked formula is the divisor summatory function that like the name is the sum exceeding the divisor function. The Von function is related to the divisor function through the summatory function. The subsequent chebyshey function ψ(x) is the summatory function associated with the von Mangoldt function: There are various aspects that surround the Von function. Many questions have been asked as to whether the Von function is multiplicative. The von function is one of the most significant arithmetic function that cannot be classified as additive or multiplicative. An arithmetic function a is said to be completely additive if a (mn) = a (m) + a (n) for all the natural numbers m and n. An arithmetic function is attributed to be completely multiplicative if a (mn) = a (m) a (n) for all the natural numbers m and n. Two whole numbers n and m are referred to as comprise if their greatest common divisor equals 1, meaning that there

Personal Response on Sexuality Identity Essay Example for Free

Personal Response on Sexuality Identity Essay * Relate value systems and critical thinking to your sexual decision making before and after this course. * Describe the effect of environment and historical perspectives on your sexuality. * Discuss the development of your gender identity. * Analyze the effect of attraction and love in your relationships. * Discuss another topic of this course that is interesting and useful to you. Relate this topic to your life. When I first started this class I had no idea of what I was in for and then the first class took me back to when I was a young girl and had no clue about what I wanted or who. I never thought about boys much when I was in school and that made think maybe I was different than other girls, because they dated and I didn’t, was there something wrong with me or was I just waiting until I met the right person. I now know that I was just waiting for the right guy and the right time to even think about sex.I have learned in this class that even though I am not confused now that back then it was a normal thing to be confused and wonder if I was different. Back when I was young the fear of being different was about the only thing that we ever had to face (besides getting pregnant), I was raised Catholic and being different was and still is frowned upon, so when I would talk to my mother she would simply tell me that my body wasn’t ready and now after this class I can see that what she said was right, my body and my mind wasn’t ready to make that choice and when it was I knew what I wanted. That is still what a lot of the youth today have to face and understand, if their bodies are ready they have to make sure that they understand everything that goes along with being sexually active. The biggest thing that helped me understand my sexuality is that I grew up watching â€Å"Little House† and my parent’s, and also my grandparent’s. These things made me realize that I was meant to be with a man and to love only one person for life. I know that before I started dating I thought at one time that maybe I was meant to be with a girl not a boy, but then I went to church more often and after reading the bible (a lot) I was to be with a man if I wanted to be part of my family.  Even today if I was to be with a woman not my husband my family would never talk to me again. That is a lot for one person to have to deal with and that is what a lot of people have to deal with on a daily basis. I believe that if you want to be with the same sex then you should do what is going to make you happy, not everyone around you. In history if you laid down with the same sex as you everyone thought that you had something wrong with you and wanted you locked up, to make you change. I never wanted to be a problem for anyone, so I choose to do the right thing and go along with what everyone in my Catholic family told me that I should be like. I don’t regret it, but sometimes wonder if I gave in to easily and was too scared to be different. History has not been kind to people who are different and the same goes for people these days, if you’re different than them then they want to change you and make you like them. I was always told that I would go to hell if I ever even thought about women the way I was to think about a man, today I tell my daughters that if a women can make them happy and not hurt them then go ahead, I wish that that had been said to me. When I first started to date me only went out with people that I knew my parents wanted me to date, I never thought about being attracted to them or even interested in them. I know that being attracted to someone is one of the most important things when thinking of going out with them, but sometimes people do it (have sex) without thinking about it or any feeling at all. That is what I did for a long time and that took me some time to realize that I was onl y hurting myself and the men didn’t care why I was doing it. When I first fell in love with my husband we weren’t even dating, I met him at my sister’s and felt my heart beat faster every time he was around, that made me want to change for the better and the more I thought about him the more I wanted to be with only him. I know that love doesn’t always happen when you want it to or for whom you want, but it does happen. People I think need to be patient and kind to others and learn that putting yourself out there (so to speak) is the only way that you will realize that someone can love you and once you know that and learn to love yourself in spite of everything that has happened in the past, love is a wonderful thing and so is just being attracted to someone. Just knowing that my husband is going to be there no matter what I do or say gives me the sense of self that I can’t control. The topic that hit home really hard for me during this class was: Sexual Abuse  of Children. This hits home on two different levels, first I was abused as a child by my uncle and my grandfather. No one believed me and I felt completely alone and scared all the time. I do believe that this was one big factor on me not knowing who I was or what I wanted when I was the dating age (as my mother would say), I wouldn’t look or talk to any of the boys and got into fights with the girls, I always tried not to be home when my uncle had to watch us, but it never worked. So I ran away and that was when I started talking to someone who could help me deal with all the feeling that I was having. It took me (what seemed like forever) some time and at times even today I think about it and just want to cry, I still to this day don’t have anything to do with that uncle and never have forgiven him and never let him around any of my daughter’s. The second reason for this topic is that my daughter was raped when she was 15 and that brought up all of the feelings that I had as a young girl. I did everything that I could, I got her counseling and we pressed charges against the man who did it to her. She is doing some what alright,except she only wants to date a lot older men and started being sexually active shortly after that happened to her, she still has night terrors over it, but is getting the help that she needs and is talking more about it which is one of the best ways of dealing with childhood trauma. After taking this class my daughters and I are a lot closer because we talked about my assignments every week and they seem to want to talk to me more about what is going on with them. I never really talked to my mother about what I was feeling and that did more harm than good in my eyes. No day’s you have to be open and honest with young people and then maybe they will want to be open with you. Telling my girls that no matter what is going on with them I will always be there for them is the best thing that I could do for them. If there was one thing that I could change about the way that my thinking was before this class, it would be to be more open minded about things that I wonder about, like how can someone who has been with a man/women all there life’s change and flip it.I mean that I was always confused as to how someone would be gay,bi,and how did they know without a dought in their minds. I never really had any friends that were not straight and this class helped open my eye’s as to maybe why someone would be the way that they are without passing a bad thought about it.I’m really glad that I had the chance to get to know myself a little bit  better and understand a few other things that had me wondering.

An Introduction To Political Cleavage Concepts Politics Essay

An Introduction To Political Cleavage Concepts Politics Essay The concept of a political cleavage is contested in important ways (Daalder 1966, Eckstein 1966, Dogan 1967, Zuckerman 1982, Bartolini Mair 1990, Neto Cox 1997), and whether cleavages exist in post-communist Eastern Europe might depend substantially on how the term is defined. Some authors who find that cleavages are weak or absent in the region use a rigorous definition of the term (Lawson 1999). It is argued here, however, that even when the definitional barrier is raised to a high level, political cleavages are in all likelihood present in the region(Whitefield 2002). Many studies have found a link between pre-communist historical legacies and institutional choice. For example Kitschelt argues that pre-communist experiences had an influence on the communist regime which ultimately has an impact on party cleavages. Indeed, he argues that pre-communist experiences can be distinguished rather easily, but the length of the political liberalisation phase in the 1980s and the significance of having had two or three rounds of free elections since 1990 may be disputable. While I do not believe that isolating these pre communist legacies is necessarily, I do believe that pre-communist legacies must be included in any analysis of post-communist social cleavages. I suggest that history is very important for the cases of Romania and Hungary. Furthermore, if we go back to Dalton, he insists that religious cleavage has followed the same pattern of decline as for the class cleavage. As he sees, one possible exception to the rule of declining social cleavages involves race and ethnicity. Nevertheless, even today, social, religious and ethic identities of citizens still have explanatory power in examination of voting behavior (Nieuwbeerta, 1998; Knutsen Scarbrough, 1995). The question on the relation between a countries social cleavage structure and political outcomes has become of extra relevance in Eastern European nations after the collapse of totalitarian regimes. Since the velvet revolutions in 1989 the political party structure in these nations had to be build almost from scratch, the question rises, according to Nieuwbeerta(1998), whether these new political systems developed in a way similar to how it is organized in Western nations. Therefore, to what extent are party systems in Eastern European nations based on major socio-economic cleavages in these nations? At first it is seems like that most newly founded parties in Eastern Europe represent such cleavages. For example in Romania and Hungary Social-Democratic and Liberal parties were created, as well as religious and nationalist parties. The concept of a political cleavage, however, is not universally regarded as useful by political observers of the post-communist world (White et al. 1997, Elster et al. 1998). Indeed, in a highly influential and controversial account published soon after the collapse of communist power, Fukuyama (1992) interpreted the event as an indicator of the end of ideological division across all modern societies, East European ones included. The collapse of communism could be seen as demonstrating either broad support for liberalism or, if we want to put the argument negatively, the absence of any alternative method of organizing modern society. From this perspective, although transition in the region would certainly have its winners and losers, the end of ideological competition meant that the political cleavages that had divided populations across industrial societies, most famously characterized by Lipset Rokkan (1967), were anachronistic. Differences among politicians and choices among vot ers would in this context be based on who could best do the job of delivering on liberal, market, and democratic policies(Whitefield 2002). But whether cleavages were envisaged or not, scholarly interest in the cleavage structures (or lack thereof) in post-communist states was often strongly grounded in pessimistic assessments of their putative effects on party competition and on the stability of these new democracies (Cirtautas 1994, Comisso 1997, Elster et al. 1998). According to these ideas, there are at least two important questions that should be answered. First, although the general shape of the cleavage structures of post-communism is better understood, the mechanisms for their formation are unclear or disputed. Most explanations of cleavages in more established democracies emphasize the importance of prior social organization in providing sources of interest and political allegiance among the public that allow coordination of voters and parties in structured and relatively stable ways (Sartori 1969, Przeworski 1985). Such prior social organization, however, was largely absent across Eastern Europe. Second, in order to speak with full confidence about the existence of cleavages, it is necessary to see stability and persistence in social and ideological divisions, but naturally these conditions are only weakly established empirically. There are also differing theoretical expectations about the stability of the social and ideological divisions in politics. Considerable volatility is evident in support for particular parties, and political parties themselves have often been short-lived, offering voters little opportunity to reward or punish them. But is this volatility of supply and demand for parties a sign of instability in the cleavage structure? For many countries, there is limited evidence available to test these possibilities because follow-up studies that might allow over-time comparisons have not yet taken place; however, it should be noted that where such evidence is available, it points to more stability than change in the structure of underlying social and ideological di visions, which strengthens claims about the existence of cleavages in the region and especially in Romania and Hungary. 2. The cleavage hypothesis If we want to understand the idea and the formation of cleavages, we should first find appropriate explanation. Party nationalisation might be explained as a consequence of the territorial structure of social or socio-economic divides (Lipset Rokkan, 1967). Caramani (2004, p. 15) addresses the centre-periphery and the urban-rural cleavage as territorial divides, connected to low levels of nationalisation. In contrast, functional cleavages, such as the economic cleavage in Western Europe, do not have a territorial character, so that parties organising along such cleavages are highly nationalised (cf. Caramani, 2004; Cox, 1999, p. 159). The explanation of party system structures by cleavages has been criticised though, because cleavages do not convert into parties as a matter of course, but this is produced by the political system itself (Zielinski, 2002, p. 187). Looking at Central and Eastern Europe, only a few scholars are looking for similarities of political divisions with social cleavages in Western democracies (Kitschelt et al., 1999). The view overwhelms that cleavages, especially if they are narrowly defined, are of limited relevance in the region (Elster et al., 1998, pp. 247-270). However, one social divide appears to be an exception to the rule: The ethnic divide is salient in Central and Eastern Europe (Evans Need, 2002) and helps many parties to mobilise their voters (Elster et al., 1998, p. 252). Ethnic minorities exist in almost all countries, and they vote in large numbers for their own parties. Furthermore, issues related to ethnicity help as well nationalist parties of the titular nation to mobilise their voters. The investigation of ethnic divides in order to explain party nationalisation degrees may yield promising results, as many of the ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern European countries are territorially settled. If such ethnic divides become manifest in party politics, then the ethnic structure of a country will explain why the electoral strength of political parties varies across regions. If we take into account the cases with Romania and Hungary, the best example could be inter-war Transylvania- the large ethnic Hungarian and German minorities constituted approximately 40% of the population, and all of the minorities were either Catholic or Protestant. If we add to this figure the number of Romanians that belonged to the Greek Catholic Church, then approximately 70% of Transylvanias population belonged to a Western Christian denomination prior to the communist takeover. These figures are important because, as Kitschelt argues, these pre-communist legacies influenced the communist reform process. In the case of Transylvania and Galicia these cultural and religious differences had a marked impact on the regions during the communist period. Nevertheless, Transylvania has traditionally been perceived, even during the communist period, as ethnically, culturally and politically different from the rest of the country. Therefore in order to assimilate Transylvania, nationali sm was an important ideological component of Romanian communism, particularly under Ceausescu. He promoted a form of national populism characterised by pseudo-egalitarianism and the non-recognition of any kind of diversity'(Whitefield 2002). However, the existence of diversity across post-communist states in the content of political competition is not evidence for diversity in cleavage structures. Support for political parties may vary as a result of many factors, discussed below, that are not connected to cleavages. And even if partisanship appears to be rooted in ideological and social differentiation, this may not result from social and ideological divisions in the population but rather from party strategies(Whitefield 2002). According to the empirical investigation, that Whitefield and Evans had done, there is a relationship among social and ideological differences and partisanship that would be expected if political cleavages were present. Naturally, although economic differentiation was common to all countries (if not always to the same degree), not all social identities and differentiated social experiences were equally present in all states; in particular, the religious and ethnic composition of countries in the region varies markedly. As a consequence, we found that the connection of social division to ideological division also varies; religiosity appears to matter much more to social liberalism in Catholic than in Orthodox states; and issues of ethnic rights are more firmly socially rooted where minorities exist and where the sense of social difference between ethnic groups is more strongly felt. This variation in the nature of social and ideological division is important because it appears to rela te to the nature of divisions that emerge in support for political parties(Whitefield 2002). TABLE 1: Political cleavages in post-Communist Eastern Europe (Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary): social and ideological divisions to partisanship Social bases Ideological bases Romania 1. Age, region (Bucharest), education 2. Ethnicity (Hungarians) economic liberalism, pro/anti-West 3. Region (Transylvania) 1. Social political liberalism, economic liberalism, pro/anti West 2. Ethnic liberalism 3. Pro-West, Jews Bulgaria 1. Ethnicity(Turkish) 2. Age, Class( professionals vs. workers) 3. Religiosity 1. Economic liberalism, pro/anti-West 2. Ethnic liberalism 3. Nationalism, Gypsies Hungary 1. Age 2. Religiosity 3. Class (urban-rural), education/class, settlement size, denomination(Protestant) 1. Economic liberalism, pro/anti-West 2. Social political liberalism, Jews 3. Social political liberalism, nationalism 3. Politics between economy and culture- the case of Hungary In order to continue to analyze the formation of cleavages in Eastern European states, I will try to give example with Hungary. Before that, I would like to point out some of the most important theories of Stein Rokkan linked with the work of S. M. Lipset. As a consequence of the early death of S. Rokkan, his work, in spite its richness and extension, can not be regarded as finished. Here are the basic ideas: 1. Territory as a key concept of politics in a cross pressure between culture and economy, implying: the equal weight given to economic, political-territorial and cultural dimensions; the interaction between geographical spaces and socio-cultural membership spaces, between center formation and boundary building; the conceptual map of Europe with an West-East axis differentiating between economic conditions for state-building and a South-North axis between cultural conditions for nation-building. 2. The identification of four cleavages following the critical junctures of: the national revolution creating the center-periphery and the church-state cleavages; the industrial revolution creating the urban-rural and the labour-capital cleavages. 3. The cyclical movement of cleavages: towards a national-international divide. It is often forgotten that Rokkan does not end his cleavage sequence with the worker-owner conflict of the industrial revolution, but points to an intriguing cyclical movement: breakdown of a supranational order (Roman Empire) establishment of culturally and politically distinctive nation states conflict over national versus international loyalties. (Lipset-Rokkan 47-48) Although the last formulation relates to the communist cleavage within the labour movement (not relevant any more), but in his latest works he points to the centrality of a reformulated version of a center-periphery divide: that between homogenizing supranational standardization and cultural distinctiveness, roots, national identity. ( Rokkan- Urwin, Flora 1983: 434). 4. The different political impacts of a gradual, organic sequence of cleavages ( in most of North Western Europe) versus the cumulation of state and nation-building cleavages together with the rapidity of enfranchisement and sudden modernization. The second alternative especially in the case of the discontinuity of or threats to national independence implies difficulties in transition to mass democracy. (Hungary is directly mentioned by Rokkan in this latter context.) Territorial-cultural conflicts do not just find political expression in secessionist and irredentist movements, however, they feed into the overall cleavage structure and help to condition the development not only of each party organization but even more of the entire system of party oppositions and interests (Lipset-Rokkan 41). 5. The historical long term continuity of collective political identities coalitions and oppositions on the level of alternatives, of parties and of the support market to be mobilized. Parties do not simply present themselves de novo to the citizens at each election; they each have a history and so have the constellations of alternatives they present to the electorate. (Lipset-Rokkan). Emerging cleavages affect, however, former alliances and restructure the party system. Rokkan points also to the existence of a certain lee-way for parties to translate social cleavages. 6. The freezing of party alternatives with the final extension of suffrage (mostly in the twenties), implying the inclusion of the lower classes. In contrast to an expanding support market with a creative phase of parties (Cotta 102) accompanied by a mobilization along cultural and territorial cleavages, the mobilization on the basis of purely economic cleavages comes only afterwards (Rokkan 1980: 118). The stage of mass democracy brings about an ever more closed electoral market with a mobilization controlled by the already existing parties. 7. The special role of social democratic parties on the left side of the labour-capital cleavage. Due to their strength and domesticability, their ability to maintain unity in the face of the man forces making for division and fragmentation (Lipset-Rokkan: 46), social democratic parties and the class cleavage in itself played a stabilizing and homogenizing, cohesive influence in most West European party systems. In countries with a troubled history of nation-building, marked cultural cleavages reduced their potentials. But the very logic of pluralism in democratic capitalism helped their entry into national politics. These parties, having joined the nation contributed to the neutralization of the radicalizing effects of sudden industrialization. (Lipset-Rokkan: 46, 48, 50). 8. The radical rightist anti-system cleavage. The rising networks of new elites, such as the leaders of the new large bureaucracies of industry and government, those who control the various sectors of the communication industry, the heads of mass organizations, the leaders of once weak or low-status groups, and the like constitute the focus of protest of fascist-type parties, which: are nationalistic, they venerate the nation and its culture; are anti-democratic; want to unite their supporters as one single pillar lead by deeply felt convictions about the destiny and the mission of the nation. These xenophobic and racist parties may mobilize segments of the middle and lower classes. As to their emergence and chances of success, contrasts in the continuity and regularity of nation-building certainly played a role (Lipset-Rokkan 23, 24, 25). After we pointed out some of the most important ideas from the Lipset and Rokkan concept, now I will try to form several important assumptions: The evolution of the Hungarian party system confirms the classical sequence of European cleavage formation with the initial and decisive emergence of identity-based territorial and cultural divides followed later by the appearance of economic cleavages. Hungarian party competition seems to reflect and even to anticipate new developments of Western party systems. There are real historical alternatives expressing different conceptions of modernization, of nationhood and of geopolitical location represented by the parties. For Rokkan and Lipset, party alternatives and the party system itself freeze. In Hungary and in some other Eastern European countries, intervals, parties and party structure are unstable and fluid. But the alternatives contained in the cleavage structure are amazingly stable: not the party system, but the cleavage structure is frozen. In the formation process of the parties (1988-89), in the subsequent three elections from 1990 to 1998, the same cleavage sets have mattered and structured party competition, namely: the three cleavage families of Westernization vs. traditionalism, post-communism vs. anti-post-communism and pro-market commodification (winners) vs. welfare statist decommodification (losers). This special freezing of alternatives and cleavages has, however, taken place in the context of a very much open and available electoral market . This deviance from the Rokkan-Lipset freezing pattern is the unavoidable consequence of the long discontinuity of the party system, the lack of traditions of mass democracy and the unstable interest structure of civil society. Due to the strong economic, social and political positions of the post-communist elites and surviving value orientations in the electorate, the definition of the rules of the game as a systemic issue (Offe 1991, Mair 1997) is expressed by the salience of a post-communism anti-post-communism cleavage family. It cannot be deducted from the Rokkan-Lipset scheme, and by its very nature, cannot become a long-enduring historical divide, but can be supposed to fade away. The taming of capitalism, the political regulation of the market with a political mobilization along a commodification decommodification axis is a crucial point of democratic consolidation and legitimacy. Following from the freezing of the Hungarian political cleavage structure in the phase of the dominance of the cultural-territorial and post-communist cleavage families, the increasing importance of this socio-economic divide is coupled with its absorption by or inclusion into the other two cleavage families. The post-1989 evolution of the Hungarian party system has brought about no political mobilization along the line of a classical labour-capital class cleavage. Finally, we should now indicate the main cleavages formed in Hungary, according to Mair: 1. The family of territorial and cultural cleavages Traditionalist forces stress historical continuity, Hungarian nationhood, favour community ove society, are for strong authority, strong church. Their value orientations are more particularist than universalist, they have an inclination to love the rural, even if they are urban Westernizers are outward-looking, for catch-up modernization, they favour individualism, multicultural diversity, they stress secularism and human rights. 2. The family of post-communist cleavages This set of cleavages has several dimensions an ideological dimension of anticommunism which can be based either on particularist national, religious identities or on the universalism of individual human rights and rationality; a political dimension expressed in the relationship to the Socialist Party looked upon as the successor party; a power dimension of competing elites and of the re-definition of the rules of the game outside and inside politics; a structural dimension reflecting the symbiotic dualism of the present society with a secto rooted in late communism and a sector of emerging capitalism iv; an emotional and biographical dimension with a population split into two halves: one half who feel they lived better in the last years of real socialism and another half thinking differently. 3. The family of socio-economic cleavages With economic transformation progressing and with an overwhelmingly materialist electorate this set of cleavages has become central in the society, but the early freezing of the party system structured along the above mentioned two cleavage sets is still complicating the clear translation of this divide into programmatic and public policy alternatives. 4. Old Theories vs. New Parties: Romania Post-communist party system Surprisingly, post-communist cleavages in Romania have been the spotlight of relatively little attention. Indeed, as Crowther writes: If skeptics are correct, Romania should stand out as a strong case for the inapplicability of social cleavage analyses. Because of the peculiarities of its pre-communist and communist past, Romania is often taken as an archetypical example of the post-communist countries dearth of civil society. Or, in other words, it is almost impossible to test the theory of Stein Rokkan or S.M. Lipset, without necessary sharing Crowthers point of view on the inapplicability of social cleavage analyses. Most recent works on the concept à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾post-communist cleavages commence with a few comments on Lipsets and Rokkans cleavage theory applied to the case of Central Europe. One of the most respectful professors from Bulgaria- Georgi Karasimeonov indicates that Lipsets and Rokkans cleavage theory was formulated on the special conditions and terms of a particular European western model. Karasimeonov contributions to the debate can be interpreted in the tradition of the analysis of the electoral behavior and party formation in transnational societies revealing at least four types of cleavages: residual (historical), transitional, actual and potential8. De Waele, seeks to clarify and categorize the relationship between the original theory of cleavages as it is applied to Western model and the post-communist experience undertaking his project with the view of three cleavages: 1. The first set of objective considerations influencing the emergence of the post-communist party system concerns the economic cleavage. De Waelle argues that the socio-economic cleavage (à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾maximalist vs. à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾minimalist) comes from the communist regimes successful orientation towards destruction of the capitalist economy. De Waele himself flags up this problem with his own definition: the term à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾maximalist is used to describe the adherents of a fast transition. In theory, the claim that the à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾minimalist perspective is likely to have a socioeconomic basis has been highly dependent upon overall record of mixed progress with uneven and slow reform implementation. On the contrary, the à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾maximalists represented the turning point for the post-communism. à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾The maximalists launched new reform programs, a macroeconomic plan stabilization and structural reforms, an ambitious shock therapy for the Romanian economy, including the liberalization of prices and the foreign exchange market as well as the accelerati on of the privatization. 2. The second cleavage, the so-called à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾authoritariandemocratic divide, refers to the inability of a significant part of the society to renounce in discursive terms the communist legacy (although, in Romania this did not necessarily translate into a rejection of all kind of authoritarian attitudes). In many recent studies on authoritarian attitudes in postcommunist Romania, researchers have pointed the electoral success of Vadim Tudor in 2000, à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾as a distinctly unpleasant surprise for many in the West. The case in point was the increase of supporters of a latent antipluralist attitude towards the European values arena. 3. The third cleavage line is between the communists and the anticommunists. The à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾old attitude, a so-called à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾pre-communist behavior was usually reactivated after the emergence of the new parties. Given the discontinuity of the transition, à gh concludes that the confrontation between the two groups led to the formation of a multi-party and the à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾first generation parties. He also witnessed the fact that the new parties were formed à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾as second generation parties, and the third category, the so-called small à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾third generation appeared much later. In a similar way, Gill argues that it is difficult to establish the real significance of the cleavage between the two types. He also indicates there have been at least three referential ways to see post-communism: à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾post-communism as a system, à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾post-communism as a condition, à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾post-communism as a situation. After this analysis of the main three cleavages that the Romanian post-communist system has experienced, it is almost impossible at this point to raise the discussion of a consolidated democracy. With politics in Romania still changing, the outlines of the three families of cleavages advanced in this article constitute a significant obstacle towards consolidation. 5. Conclusion Finally I would like to go back to some of the main points I have presented: The evolution of the Eastern European party system confirms the classical sequence of European cleavage formation with the initial and decisive emergence of identity-based territorial and cultural divides, with their dominance over socio-economic divides followed later by the appearance of economic cleavages. The salient manifestation of the cumulation of cultural and territorial cleavages in the part system corresponds clearly with the cyclical movement in the framework of the Rokkanian scheme demonstrating how globally the centrality of a national-supranational divide. The example with Hungarian party competition seems to reflect and even to anticipate new developments of Western party systems. There are real historical alternatives expressing different conceptions of modernisation, of nationhood and of geopolitical location represented by the parties. These alternatives are olde than the most of the Eastern European electorate, but they deviate from the mainstream in Western Europe. In the formation process of the parties (1988-89), in the subsequent three elections from 1990 to 1998, the same cleavage sets have mattered and structured party competition, namely: the three cleavage families of Westernization vs. traditionalism, post-communism vs. anti-post-communism and marketization, commodification (winners) vs. welfare statism. This special freezing of alternatives and cleavages has, however, taken place in the context of a very much open and available electoral market . This deviance from the Rokkan-Lipset freezing pattern is the unavoidable consequence of the long discontinuity of the party system, the lack of traditions of mass democracy and the unstable interest structure of civil society. The post-1989 evolution of the Hungarian and Romania party system has brought about no political mobilisation along the line of a classical labour-capital class cleavage. Instead, I have observed the following attempts for bringing the welfare statist decommodification cleavage in: coupling it with the post-communist cleavage, coupling it with the defence of national identity, coupling it with the religious cleavage, coupling (its radical variant) with an aggressive and racist social nationalism. After all, I still believe that formation of cleavages in East Europe, according to the thesis of Lipset and Rokkan, is almost impossible to apply to these countries. However, the cases which I in detail discussed (Hungary and Romania), are the best example for the existing of cleavages in Eastern European states. Therefore, indicates that even the model of Lipset-Rokkan was more applicable for Western European countries, especially because of different economical and political development, the existing of cleavages in East Europe was possible even before 1989, and the model is still useful nowadays.

How Music Effects Mood and Perception in Motion Pictures Essay

Music is a fundamental necessity in the world that we live in today. We all implement music in our everyday lives whether it’s professionally or solely for entertainment purposes. Some people build careers on music as musicians, composers, singers, or teachers while the latter of us just need music to get through the day whether we’re driving or at work or just need to relax. The need for music in our contemporary society affects us in a myriad of different ways--including the undeniable effect on our moods. The sound of just one note, one chord, can send an instantaneous message to the brain that, psychologically, can make us think or act in a certain way. These reactions can positively or negatively our moods depending on the composer’s intentions and our perceptions. Filmmakers implement the same idea using music to evoke a certain feeling or reaction/perception in their audience.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Music in motion pictures is an indispensable tool filmmakers utilize to effect the mood of their audience. It often gets underrated as a predominant psychological force as it is employed subliminally by filmmakers under their narrative so that their audience is unaware of its presence. Nicholas Cook, author of Analyzing Musical Multimedia, states, â€Å"words and pictures deal primarily with the specific†¦while music deals primarily with responses--that is, with values, emotions, and attitudes†¦.†(22). However, there is certain music that is suppose to be heard by the audience as part of the cinematic diegesis. All sounds that are understood by characters in the narrative are referred to as diegetic; however, those sounds that are not part of the diegesis are referred to as nondiegetic. This would suggest that diegetic music is processed on the conscious level while nondiegetic music might remain on the subconscious level (Gorbman, 75). Although many people might be unaware of these two types of sounds while screening a film, it effects their reactions, interpretations, and moods significantly.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The role of music in a motion picture is in direct relation to the level of ambiguity in a particular visual scene. The more ambiguous a scene is, the more filmmakers rely on their composers to develop a musical score that interprets the meaning of the scene for their audience. Therefore, music provides a cue for the listener to tell... ...t in a film and exactly how they felt in that moment. Most importantly, music sets the pace of a film to play on our emotions. Some films are slow and emotive that allow directors to incorporate music to influence the audience’s emotions; other are fast paced and exciting which can also exuded through the use of music. Where would the art of cinema be without the use of music today? I know for sure that films wouldn’t be as powerful and as captivating to the mind and soul of viewers without the use of this powerful tool.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Works Cited Boltz, Michael. â€Å"Musical Soundtracks as a schematic influence on the cognitive processing   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  of filmed events.† Music Perception. Vol. 18 (4). 2001. Cook, Nicholas. Analyzing Musical Multimedia. Oxford University Press: New York,   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  1998. Gorbman, Claudia. Unheard Melodies: Narrative film music. Indiana University Press:   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Bloomington, Indiana, 1987. Langer, Suzanne. Feeling and Form. Prentice Hall: London, 1977. Whittall, Arnold. â€Å"Leitmotif† The New Grove Dictionary of Music Online. 2003. 20 Nov.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  2004. .

Europe after the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter Reform

Europe after the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter Reformation The period immediately following the Protestant reformation and the Catholic counter reformation, was full of conflict and war. The entire continent of Europe and all of it's classes of society were affected by the destruction and flaring tempers of the period. In the Netherlands, the Protestants and the Catholics were at eachother’s throats. In France it was the Guise family versus the Bourbons. In Bohemia, the religious and political structures caused total havoc for over thirty years; and in England, the Presbyterians thought that the English Anglican Church too closely resembled the Roman Catholic Church. Religion was the major cause of the widespread turmoil that took place throughout Europe between 1560 and 1660. One example of a battle in Europe that was caused by religious conflict took place in the Netherlands, between the Dutch citizens and their ruler Phillip II of Spain. When he tried to gain control of the catholic church there, the Dutch rebelled. The Protestants began to assault the Catholics, destroy their churches, and revolt against Phillip and his strict Catholic codes in 1572. The conflict ended in 1579 with a twelve year truce, when seven of the seventeen provinces united under Calvinism and William of Orange, and formed the United Provinces. The remaining ten remained under the rule of Spain. Another example of religious turmoil was the thirty-six year civil war in France, where the Huguenots were increasing in number despite the power of their enemies, the Catholics. The French Catholics, led by the noble family, Guise, faced off with the leading family of the Huguenots, the Bourbons. "The feuds which separate... ...h the freedom to choose religion), and the Presbyterians (who wanted a strict Calvinist system controlled by a strong central power). The Independents dominated the war with their New Model Army, and became an unstoppable force in England. They were led by the influential and militant Oliver Cromwell (whose nickname became "Lord Protector")of the House of Commons, and captured Charles, removed the House of Lords and the Presbyterians from Parliament, and executed the "holy anointed." Although politics did play a major role in the conflicts that occurred in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries; it was religion which was the major cause of the wars and devastation that occurred in this time period, and many times throughout history weather before or after the seventeenth century. Bibliography: The Western Experience;Chambers. pg505-535. 1997

Promote communication in health, social care Essay

Learning outcomes: Outcome 1 Understand why effective communication is important in the work setting 1.1 Identify the different reasons people communicate. The main reason we communicate is because we want or require something. This may be for comfort: We may require something for our comfort in the form of food or drink, keeping warm or cool, the use of the toilet, bathing etc. or emotional comfort. Exchange of information: We may need to give or receive information about ourselves and the choices we may need to make. Expression of our emotions: We communicate our emotions so that the people around us know how we feel and how to support us whether we are happy, sad or scared. Communication may be verbal, non-verbal, formal or informal. All communication should remain confidential on a need to know basis whatever the type of communication that has taken place. 1.2 Explain how communication affects relationships in the work setting. Communication plays a vital role in the care of an individual. I need to know what I am required to do at each service user’s call. This information is communicated to me in a variety of different ways. The service user may tell me, it is written in the care plan and in the assessment when a package is taken on. I may speak to family members or be left notes by family or other carers. If a service user is unable to communicate verbally they may gesture  to me to let me know what they need or how they feel. Effective communication helps to build a trusting relationship which allows care to be successful. Communication between carers is very important as we need to make sure that care is continuous and we work as a team. Discussions about how a service user likes their care, how difficulties can be overcome, safeguarding and general tips can and should take place via the appropriate forum. Without this communication the care team cannot function at its best. A good working relationship with open communication will lead to a good level of care for our service users. Communication from line managers is vital for me to carry out my role well. I need to be aware of situations that have occurred and the outcomes so that I can give the best care possible to my service users. As a senior carer I also need to be able to communicate well with my team of care workers. If information is not passed on this can lead to failures in the care we provide. Outcome 2 Be able to meet the communication and language needs, wishes and preferences of individuals. 2.1 Demonstrate how to establish the communication and language needs, wishes and preferences of individuals. 2.2 Describe the factors to consider when promoting effective communication. I need to be clear of the subject that I am communication.  I need to know the person has the ability to understand what I need to communicate I need to know if I need someone to interpret for me. Is there any way that I need to adapt my communication for the individual I need the environment to be suitable Does the individual need someone with them for support? I need to actively listen to what the individual is communicating to me. 2.3 Demonstrate a range of communication methods and styles to meet individual needs. 2.4 Demonstrate how to respond to an individual’s reactions when communicating. Read more:  Strategies That Can Be Used to Clarify Misunderstandings Outcome 3 Be able to overcome barriers to communication 3.1 Explain how people from different backgrounds may use and/or interpret communication methods in different ways. There are a few different ways that differences in background can affect communication. Different cultures have different views of acceptable behaviour regarding verbal and non-verbal communication for example eye-contact, distance between individuals communicating or patterns of formal conversation. In some cultures a woman should not speak unless spoken to. Different cultures also show different levels of emotion in their conversation or discussions. I some cases some cultures seem to get very emotional whereas some are encouraged not to show emotion. Language differences between cultures can cause problems. Words that are similar or even the same may have different connotations to different cultures. For example it is unacceptable for certain words to be used by certain people but fine for others to se them. Differences in body language and gestures can cause problems. For example in some cultures the nod of the head actually means no and a shake means yes. These differences mean that we need to research the cultures of the people we work with to promote effective communication. 3.2 Identify barriers to effective communication. Differences in languages, cultures and dialects including slang and jargon. Hearing or visual impairment. Relationship between those communicating. Generation difference. Physical environment e.g. noise levels, light levels and distance between those communicating. Emotion or distress. Mental health problems. The pace of communication. Learning disabilities. 3.3 Demonstrate ways to overcome barriers to communication. 3.4 Demonstrate strategies that can be used to clarify misunderstandings. 3.5 Explain how to access extra support or services to enable individuals to communicate effectively. If I come across a difficulty in communication I would consult my line manager for advice. Depending on the barriers to communication I could always contact the service user’s doctor or talk to the local authority about support services that are available. Outcome 4 Be able to apply principles and practices relating to confidentiality 4.1 Explain the meaning of the term confidentiality. ‘Confidentiality is a set of rules that limits access or places restrictions on certain types of information’. Confidentiality relates to the duty to maintain confidence and respect a person’s privacy. I have a duty to keep any information given to me by a service user on a need to know basis. The service user’s personal information that they share with me should not be shared by myself unless it is in the interest of the service user for me to share with an appropriate professional or person with a proven need to know. There are a number of legislations which cover confidentiality within care work. 4.2 Demonstrate ways to maintain confidentiality in day to day communication. 4.3 Describe the potential tension between maintaining an individual’s confidentiality and disclosing concerns. Care work is all about supporting an individual’s choices and allowing them to live their life as independently as they can, but, our duty of care sometimes interferes with this if their choices mean that they are in harm’s way or suffer a loss. If we suspect a service user is in harm’s way, suffering abuse or that they could cause harm to another person we need to disclose this information to those who are in a position to help. If we do disclose confidential information the individual needs to know why we need to share the information and that we are obliged to do this. Policies and procedures we are given to follow help us to understand what we should and should not disclose about someone in our care.